Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Wilford Leslie Neves and Gloria Gay Neves, His
Wife v. Bruce Earl Wright and Shonnie C. Wright,
His Wife : Brief of Appellants
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
M. DAYLE JEFFS; Attorneys for Defendants and AppellantsKEITH E. SOHM; Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Neves v. Wright, No. 16910 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2185

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WILFORD LESLIE NEVES and
GLORIA GAY NEVES, his wife,

'

Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.
BRUCE EARL WRIGHT and
SHONNIE c. WRIGHT, his wife,

Case No. /t,,9/o

Defendants and
Appellants,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal From Judgment of the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah
County, Honorable George E. Ballif,
Judge
M. DAYLE JEFFS
Jeffs and Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P. o. Box 683
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
KEITH E. SOHM
23rd Floor University Club Bldg.
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

r-:i
rf~

u

.:i
~

i'I

.•

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents

............--------- _.,._ ..... ____
c1~:-~. Su:·r.':-:-:-:~

..

--

C: ·~:--~·. U·:-c!i

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
NATURE OF THE CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

ARGUMENT

5

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS TO
DISCLOSE THAT THE PROPERTY WAS BEING HELD
IN TRUST FOR THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS BY
THE PARENTS OF BRUCE E. WRIGHT WAS A
BREACH OF CONTRACT ENTITLING PLAINTIFFRESPONDENTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT
POINT II

5

16

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILI:NG TO GRANT
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT SELLERS.' COUNTERCLAIM FOR DAMAGES
CONCLUSION

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18

CASES CITED

Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47,
513 P.2d 417 (1973)

14

Leavitt v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d
190 (1960)

8' 9. 10

Hall v. Turner, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d
1402 (1971)

13

Walker v. Bintz and Shaw, 3 Utah 2d 162,
280 P.2d 767 (1955)

16

Woodard et ux v. Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d
398 (1953)

7,8,17

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

WILFORD LESLIE NEVES and
GLORIA GAY NEVES, his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
vs.

Case No.

16910

BRUCE EARL WRIGHT and
SHONNIE C. WRIGHT, his wife,
Defendants and
Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-respondents, as buyers of real estate at
Fillmore, Utah, corrunenced this action asking the trial Court to
declare the purchase contract rescinded or in the alternative
to declare that the defendants-appellants had breached the
contract and ordering the return of the property and money
paid by the plaintiffs-respondents buyers on the contract.
Defendants-appellants sellers denied the breach of the contract
or the right to rescind and counterclaimed for breach of contract by the buyers for failure to meet payments under the
contract and asking the trial court to award damages for breach
of contract.

Prior to the trial of the matter, the parties
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stipulated for the sale of the property.

The matter was tried

on the issue of the plaintiffs right to rescind or the defendants right to damages for breach of contract.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable
George E. Ballif, who entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents buyers and against the defendants-appellants
sellers.

The Court entered a Memorandum decision awarding to

plaintiffs $3,000.00 plus the cash paid under the contract
less $200.00 per month rental for the period of occupancy.
Based upon such decision, the plaintiffs-respondents submitted
a judgment which included $1,918.00 attorney's fees and $604.50
interest.

Defendants-appellants made a motion to strike the

attorney's fees.

The motion was granted and after the ruling

on attorney's fees, defendants-appellants filed their Notice
of Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek to have the Supreme Court
reverse the trial court decision and rule that the trial Court
erred when it held that the failure of defendants-appellants to
disclose that they did not have title to the property at the
time of the execution of the contract gave the plaintiffsrespondents the right to rescind the contract of sale.

Defen-

dants-appellants also seek to have the Court rule that the
plaintiffs-respondents breached the contract of sale by failing
to make payments under the contract entitling defendantsSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

respondents to damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues of this appeal are
not in dispute.
The defendant-appellant seller,

Bruce Earl Wright,

had been a stockholder of and engaged in business under the
name of Wright's Ranch, Inc. prior to January, 1977.

Such

business was engaged in the wholesale distribution of milk
products produced by Western General Dairies.

Upon the ter-

mination of that business relationship, Western General Dairies
entered into a lawsuit against Wright's Ranch, Inc. and against
defendant, Bruce E.

Wright (Rec. 122:17-30).

Following the

termination of Wright's Ranch, Inc., defendant-appellants moved
to Provo, Utah County and in April of 1977 advertised their
Fillmore property for sale.

At that time, in connection with

its lawsuit, Western General Dairies' legal counsel threatened
to issue a Writ of Attachment against the defendant-appellants'
Wright's home even though they had no security interest in the
home and no judgment against the Wrights.
first letter threatening attachment.

Exhibit 10 was the

Exhibit 11 was the

second letter threatening attachment (Rec. 124:8-11).

Defen-

dant-appellants, at the time they received the threats of
attaclunent, were negotiating for the sale to the plaintiffrespondents of their residence in Fillmore, Utah (Rec. 144:22-30,
145:1).

In the face of such threats, the defendant-appellants

and the parents of the defendant-appellants, sought legal
counsel as a means to protect the home for the defendants,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
jLibrary Services and Technology Act,-administered
by the Utah State Library.
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Bruce and Shonnie Wright (Rec. 149:26-29).

Based upon the

advice of counsel, the defendants, Bruce E. Wright and Shonnie

c.

Wright executed a Quit Claim Deed (Ex. 4)

transferring

the property to Bruce Wright's parents (Rec. 124:14-23).

The

deed was delivered upon an oral agreement that the parents
would hold the property until the termination of the suit by
Western General Dairies against Bruce Earl Wright and then
would be deeded back to Bruce and Shonnie Wright (Rec.

139:3-14).

Such testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the parent,
Earl E. Wright (Rec. 150:18-21, 151:6-13).

The purpose of

the conveyance was to protect the ownership of the home for
the defendants, Bruce Earl Wright and Shonnie Wright (Rec.
151:11-13).

No consideration was given for the execution of

the deed and the parents of Bruce Earl Wright never claimed an
interest in the property (Rec. 153:1-7).
On.April 19, 1977, the plaintiff-respondents and
defendant-appellants entered into a Uniform Real Estate Contract
(Ex. 9, Rec.

106:15-18).

No disclosure was made to the plaintiff-

respondents by the defendant-appellants regarding the conveyance
of the property to the parents under the oral trust to hold it
until the termination of the litigation with Western General
D~iries

(Rec. 142:27-30, 143:1-3).

Plaintiffs took possession

and began making payments upon the purchase contract and to
First Security Bank, the first mortgage holder.
On May 31, 1977, the parties acquired proper legal
descriptions, re-signed the Uniform Real Estate Contract (Ex.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9) as Exhibit 1 and executed an escrow agreement.

They deposited

with the escrow agent a deed to the property to be delivered
to plaintiff-respondent
purchase.

buyers upon the completion of the

In February of 1978, plaintiff-respondents became

aware through an examination of the County Recorder's Office
that the defendant-appellants had conveyed the property to Mr.
Wright's parents.

Through counsel, plaintiff-respondents sent

notices that they were vacating the property and tendering the
property back to the defendant-sellers and refusing to make
further payments.

Plaintiff-respondents' letters were received

in evidence as Exhibits 6, 7 and 8.
defendant-appellant

In June of 1978, the

sellers negotiated and obtained an order

dismissing the Western General Dairies lawsuit as against
Bruce E. Wright, a copy of that dismissal was received by the
Court as Exhibit 12 (Rec. 125:13-19).

In December, 1978, the

parents of Bruce E. Wright reconveyed the property to the
defendant-appellant
Shonnie

c.

sellers herein, Bruce E. Wright and

Wright (Ex. 13, Rec. 125:25-3, 126:1-6).

The parents

gave the reconveyance without consideration and under the
terms of the oral trust agreement to hold the property for the
beneficial interest of Bruce Earl Wright and Shonnie C. Wright
(Rec. 151:6-13, 152:4-20).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FAILURE OF THE
DEFEHDANT-APPELLANTS TO DISCLOSE THAT THE PROPERTY WAS
BEING HELD IN TRUST FOR THE DEFENDAi~T-APPELLANTS BY

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE PARENTS OF BRUCE E. WRIGHT WAS A BREACH OF CONTRACT
ENTITLING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS TO RESCIND THE CONTRACT
The evidence presented by the defendant-,appellants
was not challenged or disputed by the plaintiff-respondents.
That evidence shows that prior to the time of the formalization
of the sale to the plaintiff-respondents, and during the
negotiations,de£endant-appellants received a threat by a
purported creditor with whom they were in litigation.

The

creditor threatened to attach the property which defendantappellants were about to sell to plaintiff-respondents,
10 and 11).

(Exs.

Under advice of counsel, defendant-appellants

transferred the title to the parents of Bruce Earl Wright,
one of the defendant-appellants, under an oral trust.

The

terms of the oral trust were that the parents would hold the
property for the benefit of the defendant-appellants for the
purpose of protecting the property so that a sale could be
consununated (Rec 151:6-13, 153:1-5).

Thereafter, a Real Estate

Contract was drafted by the parties, themselves, on April 19,
1977, for the sale of the property in accordance with its
terms

(Ex.

9).
Subsequent to the execution of the contract, the

plaintiff-respondent

buyers entered into possession and

commenced payments to the defendant-appellant

sellers upon

the contract and to First Security Dank, the first mortgage
holder.

Subsequent to the plaintiff-respondent buyers taking

possession, the lawsuit against the defendant, Bruce E. Wright,
was dismissed

(Ex. 125:13-21) and thereafter the property was
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reconveyed out of the oral trust back to the defendant-appellant
sellers

(Ex. 13, Rec. 126:2-11, 152:4-20).
It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the purpose

of the conveyance to Bruce Wright's parents was to protect the
title so that it could be conveyed to the plaintiff-respondent
buyers.

The Court in this case ruled that because the defen-

dant-appellant sellers did not have title to the property in
their own name at the time of execution of the contract, and
their failure to disclose such fact to the plaintiff-respondent
buyers, such facts constituted a breach of a contract entitling
the plaintiff-respondent buyers to rescind the contract and
entitling them to a refund of their monies paid, less the rental
value of the property during the period of occupancy.
In 1953, this Court spoke on just such a matter as
to the necessity of the seller having title during the period
of the purchase contract.

The facts in that case,Woodard v.

Allen, 1 Ut 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398, at page 22, were:
Plaintiffs deraigned title to part of the property by mesne conveyance, links in the chain
of which were tax deeds from the county, which
body, to eliminate doubt as to their validity,
prosecuted quiet title suits, which were determined to be ineffective by the trial court
because of defective affidavits for publication.
The trial court concluded, for that
reason, that plaintiffs had no marketable
title and hence no right to relief.
The Supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court and
ruled that the evidence failed to establish by clear and convincing proof the elements necessary to establish deceit in
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regard to the executing of the contract and entitling buyers
to rescind.

The Court saying at page 221:
We believe defendant's objections were conceived
after the stop-payment, and were· designed to
avoid a bargain regretted.

The attack in that case was on the marketability of the title
of the seller in the property during the period of the contract.
The Court held at page 222:
Defendant's attack on the marketability of
plaintiff's title was premature, since, under
the authorities, that fact is determinable,
not as of the date of execution of the contract but as of the time a vendee tenders
that which, under the contract, would require
the vendor to transfer not only marketable
title, but the title which the latter agreed
to convey.
(Emphasis added)
Even though the title had been disputed by the buyers, the Court
went on to say:
Under these facts, plaintiffs were not obliged
to prove marketable title simply because defendant raised the point.
In rendering its decision in the case now before the
Court, the trial court relied heavily upon the decision in Leavitt
v. Blohm, 11 Utah 2d 220, 357 P.2d 190 (1960).

The facts in

Leavitt vs. Blohm, were that Hancocks sold to Smiths, who sold
to Kartchner, who sold to Verda Lynn, who sold to Blohm.

After

the buyer, Blohm, entered into possession and made a downpayment and commenced monthly payments, the seller Verda Lynn
assigned her seller's interest in the contract to Leavitt.
Thereafter, Hancocks, who were the original sellers brought
an action against all parties, including Blohm, charging deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fault in the original contract, seeking cancellation thereof
and forfeiture of payments as liquidated damages.

Before

trial, Hancocks renegotiated a new contract with Kartchner and
a Cutler and thereafter, Vineyard Investment Company purchased
the interest of Kartchner and Cutler.

Leavitts claimed that

they held the controlling interest in the corporation.

However,

there was no privity of contract between Vineyard Investment
Company and the buyer Blohm.

On the trial of the matter, the

trial court held that the Leavitts had rendered themselves
unable to perform under the contract with Blohm and that the
failure of Leavitts to maintain the payments under the contract
with Hancocks had disabled them from performing their part of
the contract.

Such acts relieved the buyers from further

obligation under the contract.

This Court, in that case held

at page 223:
[W]e acknowledge our accord with the rule
relied upon by the plaintiffs that the
vendor in a real estate contract is generally
not obliged to have full and clear marketable title at all times during the pendency
of his contract of sale because, ordinarily,
title need not be conveyed until the final
payment is made or tendered; and we further
agree that the purchaser cannot use a claimed
deficiency in title as an excuse for refusing
to keep a commitment to purchase property, as
was attempted in the case of Woodard v. Allen.
(Emphasis added)
The Court then went on to state in Leavitt v. Blohm, supra,
that those facts did not fall under the general rule.

The

Court went on to say:
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The fact is that the Leavitts had attempted
abortively to bring· their contract ·into good
standing,. but had :failed. Mrs. Blohm knew that
unless the Leavitts made their payments she was
exposed to the risk of a judgment in the suit
by the HancocJ:s, not only for possession of the
property, but also for treble damages and substantial attorney•s fees.
(Emphasis added)
The Court went on to say:
We see no impropriety in the trial court's
view that where the Leavitts had permitted
their interest in the property to become involved in such a way that the buyer did not
have the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it,
coupled with the further fact that the circumstances justified forebodings that they would not
be able to extricate themselves from their
difficulties and be in a position to convey
title, she was not obliged to continue payments,
but could take such measures as seemed necessary
and prudent to protect herself.
(Emphasis added)
That is not the case now before the Court.

The parties had

not jeopardized their ability to deliver title but had enhanced
their ability to convey the title by preventing the attachment
of the properties that were to be conveyed and delivered upon
completion of payments by the plaintiff-respondent buyers.
The conveyance was an oral trust, only for the purpose of protection, and was reconveyed upon the conclusion of the litigation
against Bruce E. Wright.

No indication or involvement similar

to the Leavitt v. Blohm case was present in this case as the
payments were kept current upon the first mortgage.

In fact,

upon the default by the plaintiff-respondent buyers, the defendant-appellant sellers met the payments to First Security Bank to
protect the property for their own interest and as a protection
against loss to either party in this case.

In Leavitt v. Blohm,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Court pointed out that the sellers of the property had endeavored to bring their contract of purchase current but had
been unable to do so and that the buyer Blohm had been joined
in the lawsuit of foreclosure by the Hancocks placing their
title in jeopardy.

These facts demonstrated the inability of

the sellers of the property to convey title upon completion
of payments by the buyer.
In the case now before the Court, there was no such
jeopardy of title because the property was being·held under
the oral trust by the sellers parents so that title could be
conveyed upon completion of the purchase by the buyers.

In

fact, long before such time of conveyance would have arrived
under the terms of the contract, the defendant-appellant sellers
had terminated the litigation with Western General Dairies
favorable to themselves and had obtained the reconveyance of the
property to themselves by the parent-trustees holding under
the oral trust.
The trial court holding that the failure to disclose
the conveyance under the oral trust was a breach of contract
is contrary to the pleadings and the evidence.

There are

no allegations in the pleadings of any failure on the part of
defendant-appellants to perform any duty that they were to perform under the contract.

The claim is that they did not have

title at the time of the execution of the contract and the
failure to disclose this entitled plaintiff-respondents to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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rescind the contract.

This is in the nature of fraud in the

inducement or failure to disclose that which should have been
disclosed.

Such would require not only pleadings but a clear

and convincing proof of deceit.

-There is no evidence presented

to the trial court of any deceit or of any con.tr.adiction to
the defendant-appellants' evidence that the conveyance was in
the nature of a trust for protection of the property and not
in derogation of the beneficial ownership and rights of the
defendant-appellants to be able to consummate their contract
at the conclusion of the payments by the plaintiff-respondent
buyers.
It is significant that the testimony of the plaintiffrespondents shows that when they discovered the fact that the
defendant-appellant sellers did not have title to the property,
they made no inquiries to determine the conditions of the parents
of Bruce E. Wright holding title to this property or whether,
in fact, if Bruce E. and Shonnie Wright, the defendant-appellants,
were purchasing the property under a contract from the parents.
As shown in the testimony of Mr. Neves

(Rec. 114:13-24).

Q.
Did you ever ask them whether or not they
had a means by which, when you had finished
your payments, they would be able to convey
title to you?
A.

No.

Q.
You never asked them what the reason for
conveying the property to Mr. Wright's parents
were?
A.

No.
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Q. You never inquired as to whether Mr. Wright,
Sr. was holding the property so they would be
in a position to convey title to you?
A.

No.

This Court has consistently held that it is not the
obligation of the seller to have title at the time of the
execution of the contract but at the time of the performance.
In 1971, in Marlowe v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485
P.2d 1402, the Court reiterated again its consistent holding
on title.

The facts in the Marlowe v. Radmall case are that

the buyers entered into a contract for purchase of land with a
fruit stand on it.

Thereafter, they went to the assignee of

the seller's interest and surrendered the keys to the fruit
stand and declared that they were surrendering the property
and abandoning the property.

The seller made no protest.

Thereafter, the property was mortgaged by seller to a savings
and loan association, the mortgage was foreclosed and the
defendant-buyers and plaintiff-sellers were both joined in the
foreclosure.

The plaintiff-sellers did not defend the suit

and the mortgage was foreclosed.

The Court held that based

upon the failure of the seller to protect the title of the
property and its own inability because of the foreclosure to
convey upon completion of payments by buyers that it lost
or encumbered its ownership so that it would not be able to
fulfill its contract.

This decision is not in contradiction

to the prior decisions but demonstrates that in order for a
buyer to successfully assert the inability of the seller
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to convey title,as an excuse for the performance by the buyer
there must be some showing of actual loss of title to the
seller or a:n encumbrance that .jeopardizes the seller's ability
to deliver title upon completion of payments by the buyer.
In the case now before the Court, the conveyance under an oral
trust to the parents was for the purpose of protecting the
title against the threatened attachment.

The conveyance into

trust, the dismissal of the suit and the reconveyance did not
jeopardize the ability of the sellers here to-deliver title
upon completion of payments by plaintiff-respondent buyers
but in fact, protected that very capability of delivering
title upon payment.
This issue was again addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court in 1973 in Corporation Nine v. Taylor, and Taylor v.
Corporation Nine, consolidated cases, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d

417, wherein the Court reaffirmed the law at page 53 as follows:
First, the law does not require the vendor to
have clear and marketable title at all times
during the performance of his contract, and
is not ordinarily so obliged until the time
comes for him to perform.
The buyer should
not be heard to complain unless it appears
that it will be impossible or at least highly
unlikel that the seller will be able to perform his contract when.he is calle upon to
do so, which we do not see as the situation
here.
(Emphasis added)
It is significant in this case that when the plaintiffrespondent buyer, Neves, who was working in Salt Lake City and
commuting from Fillmore, Utah, discovered that the title was
held in the name of the parents of the defendant-appellant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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sellers, plaintiff-respondents made no inquiry whatsoever to
determine why the parents were holding the title rather than
the sellers with whom they had entered into contr.act (Rec.
114:13-16, 119:9-16).

Instead they unilaterally served the

notices of abandonment of the property and refused to make
further payments (Exs. 6, 7 and 8).

They immediately ceased

making further payments on the contract and abandoned the
property.

Upon such abandonment, defendant-appellants re-

commenced payments on the first mortgage.

The parties stipulated

that the defendant-appellant sellers should attempt to sell
the property.

This was eventually accomplished, but the sale

was at a price approximately $3,000.00 less than the price set
forth in Exhibit 9 because of damage allegedly caused by
plaintiff-respondents and the change in the market during the
interim period.

Under these circumstances, the trial court

erred in not recognizing that the conveyance under the oral
trust did not jeopardize the title or the ability of the
defendant-appellant sellers to convey title upon completion of
payments.

The trial court further did not acknowledge that

the responsibility of the seller is to be able to convey title
upon completion of payments, not to maintain ownership of the
title during the entire term of the purchase agreement.

It

would be a rare circumstance in modern day transactions when
the seller of property had title in its own name during the
entire time the Uniform Real Estate Contract was in force.
This writer alleges that it is common knowledge and this
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court can take judicial notice that under most circumstances,
the seller 0£ property. hasonly a buyer's interest to sell
under his own purchase contract and he will not have title
until mortgages running ahead of him have been paid off or
he has completed his own purchase contract in the course of
payments received from his buyer.

The trial court was in

error in ruling that the defendant-appellant sellers had
jeopardized their title giving· the plaintiff-respondent buyers
the right to rescind the contract and receive:a refund of
amounts paid.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT.ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT SELLERS'COUNTERCLAIM FOR DA.MAGES
At the time of the abandonment of the property by
the plaintiff-respondent buyers, the plaintiff-respondent
buyers ceased all payments under the contract.

By such

precipitous act in abandoning the property and ceasing payments without inquiry as to the status of title, the proper
consummation of the transaction.was foreclosed.

Simple forth-

right inquiry could have resolved such question of title.

As

pointed out in Walker v. Bintz and Shaw, Inc., 3 Utah 2nd 162,
280 P.2d 767 (1955) at page 164:
Even assuming the earnest money agreement
contemplated furnishing of marketable title
as of July 11, which we need not decide, under
circumstances such as are extant here, the
authorities generally allow a seller a reasonable time within which to perfect title--a
possibility which the plaintiff by repudiation
foreclosed.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A reasonable inquiry could have resolved the entire matter without the ensuing losses to either party.
The defendant-appellant sellers then corranenced
payments upon the first mortgage to First Security Bank,
entered into possession to repair the property and sold it
under terms stipulated by the parties.

In so doing, the defen-

dant-appellant sellers suffered a substantial loss in cost
of repair, payments made to First Security Bank during the
period of the default by the plaintiff-respondent buyers
and cost to restore the property to saleable condition.

The

trial court erred in not granting those damages as pointed out
in Woodard v. Allen, supra, at page 222:
The plaintiff in this case has alleged facts
which would justify entry of judgment for
any amount found to be due from defendant
to plaintiff because of failure to pay
installments past due.
The plaintiff in this case has alleged facts which would
justify entry of judgment for the amounts found to be damages
by reason

of plaintiff-respondents default under the contract

for failure to pay installments due and attorney's fees.
the case before this Court, the defendant-appellant

In

seller~

put on evidence as to the amount of damages, costs to repair
and restore, costs of sale and diminution of sales price as a
result of the admitted refusal of the plaintiff-respondent
buyers to make further payments under the contract.

Under

these circumstances, the defendant-appellant sellers are
entitled to judgment for their damages caused by the breach
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of contract by the plaintiff-respondent buyers.
CONCLUSION
Appellants assert that the £acts which .are not in
dispute entitle them a decision of this Court reversing the
trial court and remanding the case to the trial court for
determination of the damages appellants have suffered as a
result of the breach of contract by the plaintiff-respondents.
Respectfully submitted:
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